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Politically Connected Boards, Ownership Structure and Credit Risk: Evidence from 
    Chinese Commercial Banks 
       
ABSTRACT 
This study explores whether the nature of ownership may condition the extent and impact of 
political connections on credit risk decisions. We find politically connected boards to exert 
significant influence on credit risk. Further evidence shows that ownership type of the bank 
moderates the link between politically connected boards and credit risk. Specifically, state 
owned banks appear to be more susceptible to credit risk while independent directors in 
private banks tend to be effective monitors. Our findings have important implications for 
bank stability and provide a means to measure the success of corporate governance reforms 
carried out in emerging countries over the past two decades. 
 
1. Introduction 
Prior studies examining the effects of political connections have focused predominately on 
performance of non-financial firms with relatively little attention on financial firms (Ding et 
al., 2014a; Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). These studies document that political 
connection is a double-edged sword which has both positive and negative impact on firm 
value (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Charumilind et al., 2006). On one hand, Fisman (2001); 
Johnson and Mitton (2003); and Goldman et al. (2009) argue that political connection adds to 
firm value. They point out that political connections lead to easier access to financial 
resources such as preferential access to bank loans, lower cost of capital and consequently 
improved firm performance. On the other hand, others argue that political connection may 
lead to appointment of managers and directors with lesser qualifications thereby exerting a 
negative influence on firm value (Boubakri et al., 2012; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Fan 
et al., 2007). The above argument is consistent with the grabbing hand theory which contends 
that state and public firms are exploited to fulfil the interests of politicians by appointing 
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government bureaucrats as firm managers and directors under their control (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; 1998). 
Despite the extensive research regarding the effects of political connection on firm 
value, recent studies such as Nys et al. (2015); Hung et al. (2017) point out that the impact of 
politically connected banks has received relatively less attention. One exception to prior 
literature is the study by Hung et al. (2017) which examined the effects of politically 
connected CEO on bank performance and risk-taking. Studies that examine the effects of 
politically connected boards and the distinctive ownership structure on bank risk-taking in 
emerging country context are scant. Yet the nature of shareholders and their different 
preferences do not only engender conflict of interests but play an important role in the firm’s 
risk choices (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, it may therefore be argued that the 
nature of ownership (i.e. SOE and private ownership (POE)) may condition the extent and 
impact of political connection on bank credit decisions. This is because top executives of 
SOEs are more likely to be politically connected and pursue social objectives of the 
government due to the pressure from the state authorities compared to the privately owned 
firms (Hung et al., 2017; Du et al., 2016). Similarly, it is widely acknowledged that, the 
nature of the board and its composition are critical determinants of a firm’s investment 
decisions and the level of risk-taking within a firm. This argument supports the findings of 
Dharwadkar et al. (2000), who argue that politically connected directors may not be truly 
independent and are less effective monitors, especially in the case SOEs.  
The above suggests that political connection may exacerbates agency problems. To 
mitigate conflict of interests, agency theory emphasises a set of corporate governance 
mechanisms for firm’s decision-making and allocation of resources to influence firm risk-
taking and performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Choi, Park and Hong, 2012). Thus 
agency theory posits that the dynamic interactions between corporate governance factors are 
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important in mitigating conflict of interests engendered by political connections (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shi et al., 2018). Yet, corporate governance literature has overlooked the 
effects of interactions between firm ownership and politically connected corporate boards and 
their consequent impact on bank risk-taking. This study attempts to fill this gap by 
investigating the effects of interactions between politically connected CEO (PCCEO), 
independent directors, ownership type and credit risk of banks in an emerging country 
context where corporate governance systems appear weak. 
The purpose of this study is twofold: (i) to examine the impact of politically 
connected boards on credit risk; (ii) to investigate whether the nature of firm ownership 
moderates the effects of politically connected boards on credit risks of Chinese banks. We do 
so by employing a sample of 88 banks in China over the period of 2003-2014. Drawing on 
agency theory, we argue that politically connected CEOs may distort efficiency and credit 
decisions to serve larger political interests, particularly, in the emerging market environment 
where concentrated ownership is prevalent and corporate governance systems appear weak. 
China offers an appropriate setting in which to examine our research questions for the 
following reasons. First, China, just like other emerging countries, is characterised by weak 
institutions and underdeveloped corporate governance system (Du and Boateng, 2015; Singh 
and Gaur, 2009; Dahya et al. 2003). More importantly, the Chinese government actively 
intervenes in businesses as shareholder and economic manager to pursue social and political 
goals rather than maximisation of shareholder wealth (Du et al., 2016), thereby magnifying 
agency problems. Second, political connections are rooted in the institutional context of many 
emerging countries with far reaching implications on firm strategies, performance and risk-
taking behaviour (Chin et al., 2013; Grossman et al., 2016). He et al. (2014) support this point 
and state that building political connections is important in China because Chinese culture 
values networking in business dealings (Guanxi). Ding et al. (2014a) suggest that the Guanxi 
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often goes beyond socialisation to political connection and its complex interlink with 
business. These considerations led to the choice of China.  
Our study finds that politically connected CEO has positive impact on credit risk 
while the proportion of independent directors exerts a negative and significant influence on 
credit risk.  We also find the joint effect of state ownership (SOE) and PCCEO to increase 
credit risk. However, the interaction between POE and PCCEO tends to reduce credit risk. 
Further evidence indicates that independent director of SOEs underperform in terms of their 
monitoring role compared to POEs. The results are robust after controlling macroeconomic 
and bank-specific variables.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the focus on 
emerging country context is empirically and theoretical important, as the study allows us to 
analyse the effects of interactions of the politically connected boards and ownership types on 
credit risk in an environment where government influence over businesses is pervasive and 
corporate governance systems appear weak. Given that emerging countries have reformed 
their corporate governance systems over the past two decades, this study enriches our 
understanding of the effectiveness of corporate boards in monitoring politically connected 
banks in relation to their risk-taking decisions therefore contributing to agency theory.  
Second, the findings of this study provides new insights into how corporate boards 
with political ties interact with the nature of firm ownership to influence bank risk-taking 
behaviour in the allocation of capital in the banking sector. This is significant in that the 
ability of a country financial system to allocate capital more efficiently with minimum credit 
risk is an important prerequisite for bank stability and provides a yardstick with which to 
measure the success of reforms carried out in emerging countries over past two decades. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
institutional background. This followed by a review of theoretical perspectives of political 
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connection, relevant literature and the development of hypotheses of the study in sections 3 
and 4. Following that, is an outline of data and methodology employed in this study in section 
5. Section 6 discusses the results of the study. The final section summarises the conclusion of 
the paper.  
 
2. Institutional Background  
We start this section with a brief review of institutional background of corporate governance 
reforms in China. Firm governance in China encompasses two-tier system, namely, a board 
of directors and a supervisory board. Listed companies are required to maintain a board of 
directors, as well as supervisory board. The board of directors constitute a decision-making 
unit and the supervisory boards assume the role of monitoring the executive management. 
Both the board of directors and the supervisory boards are appointed by, and must report to, 
the shareholders which, in most cases, are the local and central governments. The board of 
directors is empowered to appoint the CEO and other senior managers, call shareholder 
meetings, implement the resolutions of shareholder meetings, determine internal management 
systems and undertake necessary decisions.  
Regarding the laws in respect of board of directors, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) enacted the first Chinese Company Law in 1993, which became 
effective in 1994 to regulate and monitor management. However, it is important to note that 
the 1993 Company Law did not provide a guide on the size of the board, the criteria for 
setting up the board and the provision of independent directors. In 1999, the CSRC modified 
the 1993 law to highlight the importance of independent directors, nevertheless the law fell 
short in several respects. For example, the CSRC (1999:p. 2) required overseas-listed 
corporations to ‘‘establish and gradually improve the system for external directors and 
independent directors’’ and proposed that “independent directors should hold more than half 
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the board seats with at least two independent directors’’. These requirements applied only to 
overseas-listed companies. For domestic listed companies, the concept of independent 
directors was first introduced in the Guidelines on Company Chapter of Listed Companies 
(CSRC, 1997) as an optional provision and that a listed company may appoint independent 
directors if necessary. CSRC (1997) specified persons who may not hold the position of 
independent director, but remained silent on the minimum number and the duties of 
independent directors (CSRC, 1997: p.117). A formal, comprehensive guideline on 
independent directors was enacted in 2001. This code specifies several requirements for listed 
companies, such as presence of independent directors in the boards, adherence to strict 
information disclosure norms, and equal status to minority shareholders. This time the law 
sets out for listed companies target for independent directors composing of, at least, one third 
of board members by June 30, 2003 (CSRC, 2001). 
One distinctive characteristic of firm governance in China is that, independent directors may 
not be truly independent and often play coordinated and harmonious roles in running the 
companies along with executive managers, especially for the majority of the listed firms that 
were previously SOEs (Lin et al., 1998; Huang and Boateng, 2016). Although Chinese firms 
maintain both a board of directors and a board of supervisors, the supervisory board appears 
to be ineffective and it is often undermined by its composition and a poorly defined 
monitoring role with respect to the board of directors and managers (Dahya et al., 2003; Yuan 
et al., 2009). 
 
3. Theoretical background 
Studies have shown that political connections have economic consequences for firms (see 
Dinc, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006). In an attempt to unpack the economic effects of political 
connections, a number of theoretical perspectives have been put forward to explain the effects 
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of political connections. Prominent among the theories include: the grabbing hand theory 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 1998); network theory (Field et al., 2013; Yang and Wang, 2011) 
and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The grabbing hand theory encompasses 
models of political behaviour that argue that politicians do not maximise social welfare but 
instead pursue their own self-serving objectives. Thus the theory contends that public firms 
are exploited by politicians through appointment of government bureaucrats as firm managers 
and directors to under their control to serve their own interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
1998). However, scholars have criticised the grabbing hand perspective by point out that the 
theory is useful in understanding the existing institutions in different countries and the costs 
and benefits of these institutions in economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
Another channel of political influence on business is the network theory. Under the 
networks theory or the so-called “network capitalism” firms and the state create a means for 
directing financial resources to social and political projects which are economically unviable 
leading to loans default (Boisot and Child, 1996). Research evidence suggests that the 
networks do not only help access resources for firms but facilitate quicker access to critical 
information on market conditions (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Yang  and Wang, 2011; Field 
et al., 2013). In the context of China, He et al. (2014) point out that building political 
connections is important in China because Chinese culture values networking in business 
dealings (Guanxi). Luo et al (2014) therefore indicate that guanxi has become the lifeblood of 
business conducts and social interactions in Chinese culture. Yang and Wang (2011) support 
the contention that through a variety of interpersonal and political network relationships, 
resources can be obtained to increase firm value. 
 Another central theory that attempts to explain the effects of political connection on 
firm’s decision and performance is the agency theory. Agency theory has become a dominant 
theory often used to explain the effects of political connection on firm performance and has 
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been tested empirically in both developed and developing countries. The overall thrust of 
agency theory posit that managers are self-serving individuals who pursue their own personal 
and economic objectives rather than corporate objectives of a firm (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Agency theory focuses on two main types of agency conflict, that is, traditional 
principal-agent conflict between shareholders and managers; and principal-principal conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders. According to Shi et al. (2018); Boateng and 
Huang (2017), all the two types of agency conflict are prevalent among Chinese firms. For 
example, government as a majority shareholder has social objectives and interests compared 
to other types of shareholders whose aim is maximisation of shareholder wealth. Similarly, 
managers and politicians maintain connections with firms not to maximise the interests of 
shareholders, but rather to serve their own personal objectives.  Ding et al. (2014b) found 
executive political connection is positively related to the executive compensation. The above 
suggests that political connection is indicative of agency problem and detrimental to firm 
value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Aggarwal et al., 2012). However, it is theoretically 
unclear whether the interaction between the ownership type and politically connected 
directors as corporate governance mechanism are effective in reducing agency conflicts. 
 
5. Literature and hypothesis development 
5.1 Political connections and firm outcomes 
Fisman (2001); and Sapienza (2004) document that political connections have both 
negative and positive effects on firm strategies and value. At one end of the spectrum, there 
are a number of studies which argue that political connections lead to favourable treatment in 
resources allocation and positive economic outcomes for firms. Under this view, scholars 
such as Goldman et al. (2009); Dinc (2005); Sapienza (2004) point out that politically 
connected firms tend to have preferential access to government contracts and acquisitions of 
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loans at lower interest rates. Shleifer and Vishny (1994); Faccio et al. (2006) further contend 
that politically connected firms are more likely to receive government funds and liquidity 
support from the central bank in the event of financial distress. In addition, Hung et al. (2017) 
document that politically connected firms may face less pressure from legislative 
compliances such as favourable deadline extensions or less regulatory scrutiny. Overall, these 
studies provide evidence that political connections have a positive and significant effect on 
firms’ economic outcomes by providing more attractive business opportunities and that 
political connections serve as insurance mechanism against extreme events for these firms. 
To Fisman (2001), political connections are a valuable resource for many firms. 
In contrast, prior studies have documented that politically connected firms have 
higher leverage ratios compared to their non-connected counterparts and tend to experience 
lower risk-adjusted returns (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2012). The foregoing 
suggests that political connections may also lead to risk-taking strategies that destroy firm 
value and this study attempts to shed lights on the effects of politically connected CEO and 
independent directors on credit risk. 
 
5.2 Hypothesis development 
5.2.1 Politically Connected CEO, Bank Ownership and Credit Risk 
Previous academic work has uncovered an evidence on the relationship between the 
politically connected boards and bank lending behaviour. Khwaja and Mian (2005) indicate 
that much of politically connected firms in an environment of poor corporate governance tend 
to be saddled with a high ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs). Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
found that state-owned banks provide preferential access to politically connected firms with 
higher probability of default estimated at 50%. Researchers such as Li et al. (2006), García-
Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta. (2014), and Sapienza (2004) have rendered some support for the 
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positive relationship between the politically connected firms and preferential access to loans. 
Despite the risks and agency costs associated with political connected lending, CEO 
continues to lend to these firms.  
In the context of China, banks with policy-directed loans constitute the largest 
proportion of the total loans of Chinese banks and grew by 95.3% in 2009 (Luo and Ying, 
2014). Scholars attribute this to the fact that, the Communist Party dominates the political 
power and controls state institutions and most of the banks in China. Government or its 
agencies routinely appoint party members and government officials to the board and 
executive management of SOEs including banks (Dong et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2007). Su, Xu 
and Phan (2008) point out that as state representatives, directors and firm leadership have a 
duty to uphold government policies aimed at reducing unemployment, improving social and 
political stability rather than maximisation of shareholder wealth. Credit standards and 
lending behaviours may conform to the political dictates and demands as noted by Luo and 
Ying (2014) and Li et al. (2008), resulting in principal-principal conflict between controlling 
and minority shareholders. Firth et al. (2008), Li et al. (2008) indicate that appointment of 
politically connected CEOs and directors are not limited to SOEs and POEs frequently 
appoint former government officials as CEOs. However, given the pervasive influence of 
Chinese government over businesses, we expect strategic direction and managerial decisions 
on lending policies and loans quality of SOEs to be more prone to political participation and 
pressures compared to POEs. In the light of the above argument, we hypothesise that:  
H1: Ownership type of the bank will moderate the link between the politically connected 
CEO and credit risk in such a way that state ownership (private ownership) will positively 




4.2.2 Board Independence, Bank Ownership and Credit Risk 
Over the past decade, there has been intense academic and regulatory interest on how to 
mitigate bank-risk taking. This is because excessive risk-taking by banks jeopardises the 
safety and soundness of individual institutions and the stability of the entire financial sector. 
Stulz (2015) argues that good corporate governance plays an important role in helping banks 
to pursue optimal level of risk to enable managers maximise firm value. The board of 
directors are widely seen as an important prerequisite for an effective internal governance 
framework (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus the board has the responsibility for risk 
management and set the tone for a bank’s risk-taking culture at the top and evaluate whether 
the current and future risk is in line with risk tolerance level of the bank (Hagendorff and 
Vallascas, 2011). Drawing on agency theory, Byrd and Hickman (1992) contend that the 
monitoring role of the board is facilitated by a board whose composition reflects a greater 
proportion of outside independent directors since such composition could represent a more 
effective way in monitoring and controlling managerial actions.  
In the context of China, the distinctive feature of boards is the presence of politically 
connected directors. As pointed out earlier, the prevalence of government directors with 
political connections provides a means for these directors to promote and execute government 
policies and agendas despite the risks associated with such policies to firms (Su, Xu and 
Phan, 2008). It is pertinent to note that, POEs often invite politically connected government 
officials with rich human and social capital to sit on their boards (Chen, 2015). According to 
Hillman (2005), the appointment of politically connected government officials to POEs is 
done to reduce uncertainty by connecting these firms to influential politicians to help manage 
their dependence on government. Consequently, the monitoring role of independent directors 
may not be effective and are influenced by factors such as their social and political ties (Zhu 
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and Yoshikawa, 2015). Strong ties with government may mean less focus on shareholder 
maximisation and higher risk taking. Ding et al. (2014b) found state ownership to weaken 
board independence. In this study, we argue that the type of ownership of the bank may affect 
the monitoring role and risk-taking behaviour due to the divergence of goals between SOEs 
and POEs and the relative bargaining power of the state agency and private investors in bank 
decision making (see Sun and Tong, 2003). Thus we hypothesise that: 
H2: Ownership type of the bank will moderate the link between the politically connected 
independent director monitoring role and credit risk in such a way that state ownership 
(private ownership) will be positively (negatively) related to credit risk. 
4.2.3 Control variables 
Following Garcia-Herrero et al. (2009), we control the macroeconomic and bank-specific 
variables, namely, CEO total compensation (CEO_TC); growth GDP (GDPR); inflation 
(INFR); unemployment rate (UNEMP); bank size (SIZE); and leverage (LEVR). Research 
evidence suggests that macroeconomic and bank-specific variables are likely to affect 
repayment behaviours of borrowers and credit decisions. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
reflects the demand and the size of the economy and affects the bank risk-taking behaviour 
and performance (Fries and Taci, 2005). Regarding the inflation, Dinc (2005) indicate that 
inflation has effect on credit markets. For example, rising inflation rate could increase default 
rates because it negatively affects real incomes of borrowers (Ghosh, 2015). Rising 
unemployment increases default risk in the banking industry and reduce bank profitability 
(Fu and Heffernan, 2009). Higher unemployment rates tend to produce more non-performing 
loans and loan loss reserves.  
Prior studies suggest that bank size affects bank profitability (e.g., Luo and Ying, 2014; Leuz 
and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). It is argued that large banks may have the capacity to extend 
loans to a large segment of the population thereby increasing its loan portfolio and default 
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rates. Sapienza (2004) contends that bank size may also influence the ability to take and 
absorb risk. According to agency theory, a positive relationship exists between CEO 
compensation and risk (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Compensation increases the incentive of 
bank CEO’s to take more risks. As a result, total compensation is positively related to bank 
risk. We therefore control the total compensation. We also include ownership type dummies, 
that is government owned and privately owned to account for the effect ownership effect in 
the regression estimations. 
5. Data and Methodology 
5.1 Data source and sample selection 
The data is derived from the records of Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR), China Statistical Yearbook published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China and the Bankscope database provided by Fitch-IBCA (International Bank 
Credit Analysis Ltd). For inclusion in the final sample, the following restrictions were 
imposed, Only commericial banks, that is, city commercial banks, rural commercial banks 
and foreign banks are selected. Policy banks, cooperative banks and investment banks are 
excluded because they may have different objectives rather than profitability. Banks with 
missing data such as non-performing loans and other relevant data are excluded. The 
imposition of these restrictions led to the final usable sample of 88 banks and covers the 
period of 2003-2014. Table 1 reports the details of the sample selection. 
 




5.2 Econometric Model 
In order to estimate the effects of independent variables on the dependent variables, we 
employ the System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM) model to carry out our 
analysis. Prior studies on internal governance indicate that research in this area should 
consider that governance variables are endogenous (Boone et al., 2007). The regression of 
board characteristics on credit risk is likely to suffer from three endogeneity problems such as 
omitted variables, reverse causality and measurement error. Wintoki et al. (2012) provide 
strong evidence that the instruments associated with a dynamic GMM approach are valid and 
more appropriate for corporate governance research. To address the problem of endogeneity, 
we employ the two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic 
panel-data system estimator with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors in 
all models. We test for second order serial correlations AR(2) and Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions for validity of our model and the GMM instruments.    










CRisk represents non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) and loan loss provision ratio (LLPR). 
The set of explanatory variables:  PCCEO and B_IND represent the politically connected 
CEO and board independence respectively. INTERACTION refers to the interaction variables 
between politically connected board and ownership type, including PCCEO*SOE, PCCEO*POE; 
and B_IND*SOE, B_IND*POE, The control variables (Controls) include: growth gross 
domestic produect rate (GDP), unemployment rate (UNEMP), inflation rate (INFR), bank 
size (SIZE) and bank leverage ratio (LEVR), and CEO total compensation (CEO_TC). .  
15 
 
5.3 Measurement of Variables 
Table 2 describes how the dependent and independent variables of our study are measured.    
Dependent Variables 
We employ two different risk measures as dependent variables and proxies for credit risk, 
namely, Non-Performing Loan Ratio (NPLR) and Loan Loss Provision Ratio (LLPR). The 
volume of NPL to total equity to account for loan portfolio risk1 (Ghosh, 2015). Following 
Elnahass et al. (2014), we estimate the LLPR as Loan Loss Provision (LLP) divided by Net 
Interest Revenue (NIR).  
 
    (Insert Table 2 here please) 
5.3.1 Summary Statistics  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. The mean value 
of NPLR is about 2.7897% which is comparable with that of Dong et al (2014) who reported 
a mean value of 2.62% for the period from 2003-2011. Regarding the PCCEO, the mean 
value is about 93.9%, indicating that PCCEO is the pervasive in the banking industry in 
China. 24.12% of the board of directors are independent directors indicating that despite 
corporate governance reforms, the proportion of independent directors of the sample banks 
appears relatively low compared to that found in the UK and other advanced market 
economies. The mean value of the total compensation for CEOs is about 4.75.  
 
                                                          
1
 We also include the volume of nonperforming loans to total equity for robustness check. 
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    (Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 4 reports the correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables. All the 
correlation coeficients are fairly low indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue. Further 
test using variable inflation factor (VIF) procedure suggests that all the correlation 
coefficients are well below 0.70 threshold thereby confirming that multicollinearity is not to 
be a problem in this study. 
 
                                                          (Insert Table 4 here)
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6. Regression Results and Discussion 
6.1 Baseline Results 
Table 5 presents the baseline results of the SGMM estimation based on two dependent 
variables, namely, NPLR and LLPR. As shown in columns 1 and 2,  the coefficient for the 
politically connected CEO is positive and significant at 1% level indicating that  PCCEOs 
exert positive and significant influence on credit risk in China. The results suggest that 
PCCEOs provide a vehicle for political interference in capital allocation to favoured projects 
with high social returns which involve high risk leading to increase in credit risks. The 
findings may be explained by the extent of Chinese government and its agencies involvement 
in the appointment of CEOs to these banks.. The results appear consistent with the findings of 
Engelberg et al. (2012) who found that firms including private ones actively look for various 
means of building business-state networks. These connections make the CEOs more prone to 
upholding government policies aimed at reducing unemployment, improving social and 
political stability. Consequently, credit standards may be lowered by the firms in the network 
and lending behaviours may therefore conform to the political dictates and demands as noted 
by Luo and Ying (2014) and Li et al. (2008) thereby increasing default rates.   
Our results in Table 5 document that the proportion of independent directors on the 
board have a negative and significant influence on credit risk suggesting that the proportion 
of independent directors tend to reduce credit risk. The results suggest that board composition 
which include outside independent directors tend to facilitate effective monitoring and the 
control of credit risk. The results appear consistent with the findings of Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012), who found the proportion of independent directors to be negatively associated with 
bank loan quality and credit risk. However, the findings are at variance with the conclusions 
drawn in the study by Dharwadkar et al. (2000) which indicates that independent directors in 
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emerging economies are ineffective, lack resources and are likely to carry out advisory role 
rather than the oversight role.  
Regarding control variables, our regression results indicate that the coefficients for the CEO 
total compensation in the two models are positive and highly significant at the 1% level 
suggesting that CEO remuneration affects the credit risk of the Chinese banks. The results 
corroborate the findings of prior studies (e.g., Ghosh, 2015). We find GDP and 
unemployment to have positive and significant effect on credit risk while inflation rate, bank 
size, leverage and ownership type are negatively related to credit risk. 
 
                   (Inset Table 5 here) 
 
 
6.2 Politically connected boards, ownership Type and Credit Risk 
In Table 6, we analyse the effects of interactions of ownership type and politically connected 
CEO and independent directors on credit risk in Models 1-4. We therefore incorporate 
interactive variables for ownership measures and PCCEO and proportion of independent 
director (B_IND) in our regression. Models 1 and 3 of Table 6 report the interaction between 
ownership type and PCCEO. We find positive and significant coefficients for the interactions: 
PCCEO*SOE (β =8.206; p<.01) in model 1 and a negative and significant effect on credit 
risk PCCEO*POE: (β =-4.271, p<0.01).  Overall, the findings in Table 6 suggest that 
government ownership are more prone to higher credit risk compared to private ownership. 
The findings may be explained by the government ownership and control of SOE through 
appointment of CEOs thereby rendering managerial decisions on lending policies of SOEs to 
be more prone to political participation and pressures compared to POEs. Thus government 
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ownership and control exacerbate agency problems. 
In the case of interaction between the ownership type and proportion of independent 
directors, we find that the interaction between independent directors and SOE appears 
positive but insignificant. However, the interaction between private ownership and 
independent directors is negative and significant. Hypothesis 2 is supported. The findings 
suggest independent directors of POEs tend to reduce credit risk compared to that of SOEs. 
The results may be explained by the nature and differences of resources and capabilities 
available to the private banks relative to state owned banks. For example, unlike state banks 
whose directors may derive their positions through political connections, independent 
directors in privately owned banks (although politically connected), may be appointed on the 
basis of their qualifications, competence, experience and capacity to perform the monitoring 
role associated with the position thereby ameliorating credit risks in these banks.  
 
 
          (Insert Table 6 here) 
 
6.3 Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our main results, we employ additional specification to rule out 
alternative explanations. To ascertain whether our main results are driven by the effects of 
2008 financial crisis, we exclude the data relating to the period of 2007/08 global financial 
crisis. The results reported in Table 7 remain unchanged suggesting the robustness of our 
main findings. 
 






This study investigates the effects of politically connected boards and further investigate the 
effects of interaction between politically connected board and ownership type on credit risk 
of Chinese banks over the period of 2003-2014. Despite a number of studies exploring the 
influence of politically connected boards on firm’s performance, virtually, no study has 
examined corporate risk-taking decisions as a function of board political orientation and 
connection in emerging market environment where institutions and corporate governance 
systems appear weak. Using a sample of 88 Chinese banks, we find politically connected 
boards to exert significant influence on credit risk. Specifically, our evidence shows that state 
ownership positively moderates the link between politically connected CEO and credit risk 
while private ownership negatively moderates credit risk. Specifically, we find state owned 
banks to be more susceptible to credit risk while independent directors in private banks tend 
to be effective monitors. However, independent directors exert a negative and significant 
influence on credit risk. Thus the joint effect of PCCEO and SOE increases credit risk while 
the interaction between PCCEO and POE tends to reduce credit risk. Regarding the 
interactions between independent directors and bank ownership, we also find the joint effect 
of independent directors and POE to be negative and significant while the interaction 
between independent and SOE appears to be positive but insignificant. Our findings indicate 
that independent directors of SOEs underperform in terms of their monitoring role compared 
to POEs. The results are robust after controlling macroeconomic and bank-specific variables. 
The finding that PCCEO exerts significant influence on credit risk suggests that the 
governments in developing countries play a bigger role in the allocation of financial 
resources through its appointees thereby distorting the credit allocation and increasing the 
probability of credit default. Further evidence based on the interactions of ownership type and 
political connected board variables indicate that SOEs are more prone to higher credit risk 
21 
 
compared to private ownership. The findings imply that the banking sector reforms carried 
out in China have not curbed the pervasive influence of the state and its agencies in credit 
allocation which often result in non-performing loans. Thus our results suggest that severe 
agency problems in Chinese banking system persists and we urge further reforms. 
Specifically, we suggest that Chinese government should pay more attention to the nature and 
scope of financial sector and enterprise reforms carried out so far and reduce state 
involvement in the operational activities of commercial banks in China to enhance efficient 
allocation of formal financing and its retrieval. Another important issue raised by the results 
of this study is the appointment of CEOs by the government and its agencies. The 
appointment of politically connected CEOs to top management positions may result in the 
use of management power to implement strategic initiatives and credit policies favourable to 
government, increase default risks among Chinese banks with far-reaching implications for 
operational viability and long-term stability of Chinese banking system and its economy. We 
suggest that Chinese government should take steps to reform the appointment of top level 
management, particularly of the SOEs. In particularly, more emphasis should be place of 
qualification, experience and track record in the field and incentivise these top level managers 
based on performance in key areas such as loans quality and reduction of non-performing 
loans. 
The negative and significant impact of the proportion of independent directors on credit risk 
suggests that oversight role of boards in emerging countries leads to substantive 
improvements in risk management and informed risk-taking as pointed out by Ittner and 
Keusch (2015).  The implication here is that board composition affect organisational 
outcomes and strategies. Consequently, the present corporate governance code where listed 
companies are required to appoint at least one-third of independent directors on their boards 
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should be raised to at least half in line with what is found in advanced countries such as UK 
and U.S.  
Despite the contribution of this study on how corporate political ties affect a firm’s risk-
taking behaviour in the allocation of capital in formal financing sector, more studies appear 
warranted. Future studies should investigate the impact of politically connected CEO and 
compensation on overall risk-taking behaviour of emerging market banks using cross-country 
data. 
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